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Cyberattacks and the Constitution
MATTHEW C. WAXMAN

Aegis Series Paper No. 2007

The United States has one of the world’s strongest and most sophisticated capabilities to
launch cyberattacks against adversaries. How does the US Constitution allocate power to use
that capability? And what does that allocation tell us about appropriate executive-legislativebranch arrangements for setting and implementing cyber strategy?
The term “cyberattack” is often used loosely. In this essay, I define a cyberattack as action
that involves the use of computer code to disrupt, degrade, destroy, or manipulate computer
systems or networks or the information on them.1 I am not including cyber operations that
are purely for information gathering or to map foreign networks in preparation for future
cyberattacks.
This definition of cyberattack still includes a wide array of operations. On one end are
attacks on computer systems that have effects—including kinetic, sometimes violent
ones—outside those systems. Examples include the Stuxnet attack that brought down
some of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges and the 2017 NotPetya attack, widely attributed to Russia,
that targeted major Ukrainian companies and government agencies but spread widely
and disabled computers—as well as commerce dependent on them—around the globe.2
At the other end are the types of low-level and often discrete attacks that appear to be
contemplated by the United States “Defend Forward” concept. Examples include infiltrating
adversary networks and deleting or corrupting data, or US Cyber Command’s operations
that disrupted the networks of Russia’s infamous “Internet Research Agency” troll farm in
the run-up to the 2018 US midterm elections.3 There are of course many possibilities in
between.
This essay offers a way to think about the constitutional distribution of powers
between the president and Congress governing the use of US cyberattack capabilities.
Some commentators and analysts view this problem almost reflexively as a “war
powers” issue—a term I use throughout this essay to refer to the political branches’
respective constitutional authority over the hostile use of military force. That is especially
true as one moves up the scale of expected damage.4 A corollary to that constitutional
issue is a statutory question: Namely, how should the 1973 War Powers Resolution,
which was intended to restrict extensive military hostilities without congressional
approval, be interpreted or amended to account for cyberattacks?5 The imprecise rhetoric
of “cyberwar,” “cyber conflict,” and “cyberattacks” probably contributes to this legal
framing.
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But many—and probably almost all—cyberattacks undertaken by the United States cannot
plausibly be viewed as exercises of war powers. Indeed, the entire Defend Forward concept
appears to involve low-level operations well below the “use of force” threshold under
international law and far short of the types of operations that have typically triggered war
powers analysis under domestic constitutional law.
This essay argues that as a conceptual and doctrinal matter, cyberattacks alone are rarely
exercises of war powers—and they might never be. They are often instead best understood
as exercises of other, nonwar military powers, foreign affairs powers, intelligence powers,
and foreign commerce powers, among other constitutional powers not yet articulated.
Although this more fine-grained and fact-specific constitutional conception of cyberattacks
leaves room for broad executive leeway in some operational contexts, this discretion is
often the result of congressional delegation or acquiescence as opposed to any inherent
constitutional authority on the part of the president. At the same time, these alternative
understandings of cyberattacks also contain a strong constitutional basis for Congress to
pursue legislative regulation of the procedural and substantive parameters governing cyber
operations.
Beyond those descriptive claims, this essay argues that a rush to treat cyberattacks
as implicating war powers misguides criticisms about the role Congress is or is not
playing in regulating cyberattacks. This is because participants in war powers debates
often bring intense and polar normative stances about the appropriate institutional
arrangements governing the exercise of those powers. On one end are those who
prize executive speed, agility, and secrecy—and therefore presidential freedom from
congressional interference. On the other end are those who see formal congressional
approval for military campaigns as being of paramount constitutional importance. The
latter, who want to roll back presidential unilateralism, often see cyberattacks as yet
another problematic means by which presidents can evade proper congressional checks
on war. But in their focus on congressional approval for military intervention, and by
extension for at least some high-intensity cyberattacks, those critics may overlook other
institutional arrangements that are better tailored to US cyber strategy, especially to the
sort of lower-intensity activities that make up Defend Forward. They also may overlook
the many important ways in which Congress is already actively involved in shaping and
facilitating that strategy.

Cyberattacks as Exercising War Powers?
Suppose the executive branch launches an operation that, through infiltration of foreign
computer networks and insertion of code, disables an adversary’s air defense system, knocks
offline parts of its banking system, or takes over control of its intelligence service’s social
media accounts. Or suppose that a US cyber operation ruins an adversary’s ballistic missile
test, temporarily shuts down some internal government communications, or disrupts a
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state-owned business’s operations. These direct effects might be small and temporary, but in
some cases they might be large and long term. Assuming that such operations do not take
place in the context of an ongoing armed conflict (and putting aside for now any additional
statutory authorities or prohibitions), what constitutional powers is the president exercising?
The answer depends a lot on the facts. Cyberattacks, as defined in this essay, encompass a
very broad set of possible activities. But a common answer is that this is at least partly a war
powers question, and thus the legality of such operations depends on the president’s power
to use military force in a given instance.
The Constitution’s drafters studiously placed the power to declare war in Congress.
Throughout American history, a strong current of thought has interpreted this choice to
imply that Congress has exclusive (or near-exclusive) power to decide whether or not the
country goes to war or initiates armed hostilities beyond cases of, in Madison’s words,
“repel[ling] sudden attacks.”6
Several overlapping normative justifications are associated with this view. One is that
requiring formal and express congressional approval ensures thorough deliberation and
thereby prevents rash military intervention. Another common justification is that no
one person ought to be able to bring violent conflict, and hence threats to American
blood and treasure, upon the nation absent the most extreme emergency requirement
for self-defensive action. For these and other reasons, including concerns that mobilizing
military power would threaten republicanism at home, there was strong consensus
among the constitutional founders that only Congress—not the president alone—should
be able to take the country from peace to war.7 Some would argue that these reasons have
grown stronger over time, as American military power and war’s destructive potential
have grown. Nevertheless and owing to a variety of factors, over time the president has
asserted, sometimes with acquiescence by Congress and the courts, vast power to use
military force without congressional approval far beyond the circumstances imagined by
Madison.8
Modern executive-branch legal precedent and practice generally hold that the president has
broad authority to launch military strikes without specific congressional authorization to
defend American interests.9 Indeed, the executive branch’s view of expansive presidential
powers to use kinetic military force is so well entrenched that putting cyber operations in
the same category may be an attractive analytic move for justifying unilateral action in
that domain, too (as well as for justifying the president’s authority to take kinetic military
responses in self-defense against incoming cyberattacks).
In a 2020 address, the Defense Department general counsel explained that the legal analysis
for the military, in particular, to conduct cyberattacks looks the same as that for kinetic
military attacks:
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The domestic legal authority for the DoD to conduct cyber operations is included in the
broader authorities of the President and the Secretary of Defense to conduct military
operations in defense of the nation. We assess whether a proposed cyber operation has
been properly authorized using the analysis we apply to all other operations, including
those that constitute use of force.10

Importantly, and elaborated below, “military operations in defense of the nation” implicate
a much broader set of constitutional categories than just hostile applications of force; most
such operations would not be exercises of war powers. The Defense Department general
counsel then laid out the overall legal framework and applied it directly to the department’s
cyber operations:
The President has authority under Article II of the U.S. Constitution to direct the use of
the Armed Forces to serve important national interests, and it is the longstanding view
of the Executive Branch that this authority may include the use of armed force when
the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the operations do not rise to the level of
“war” under the Constitution, triggering Congress’s power to declare war. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has long affirmed the President’s power to use force in defense of the
nation and federal persons, property, and instrumentalities.11

One upshot of this analysis, he concluded, is that “the President has constitutional
authority to order military cyber operations even if they amount to use of force in defense
of the United States.”12
Viewing some cyberattacks as the exercise of war powers may seem sensible for several
reasons. If they are carried out by US Cyber Command, the organization of the armed forces
tasked with conducting offensive cyber operations, the agent is the same one that conducts
kinetic attacks. If a cyberattack causes damage that might otherwise be achieved by kinetic
violence, or if the target is an adversary’s armed forces, the effect is similar. If cyberattacks
could foreseeably provoke an armed response, the consequences seem comparable.
It is questionable, though, whether the vast majority of actual and plausible cyberattacks
should be understood as exercises of war powers at all. In other words, it may be a category
error to analyze many cyberattacks as one would the application of hostile military force
abroad, either as to the scope of the president’s inherent constitutional authority or as to
any constitutional requirement for congressional approval. As mentioned above, this is
an area of constitutional law originally conceived for particular concerns about physically
armed violence—specifically by military forces—including the risks of American bloodshed
and escalation.
If war powers are a special constitutional category demanding formal congressional
approval because of the risks to American blood, most cyberattacks barely if at all
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implicate this concern, because the risks are so tiny and remote. In modern executivebranch practice, as in many criticisms of that practice, risk to American service
members is usually considered an affirmative factor in determining whether a
military intervention is of such intensity as to amount to “war” in a constitutional
sense that might require congressional approval. Low risk to American troops, on
the flip side, may help justify presidential unilateralism.13 Personnel conducting
cyberattacks are physically and temporally distant from actions that might seem
conceptually analogous to “combat.” Of course, it has long been the case that military
violence can be carried out remotely, with limited direct risks to American service
members. Drone strikes are an obvious modern-day example, but even well before
then, advances in aviation and munitions technology made possible massive bombing
campaigns with low risk to American pilots. Missiles, of course, can deliver huge payloads
from great distances.
Cyberattacks take human remoteness to an extreme, though, by placing no American lives
immediately at risk. Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, they rarely even
place foreign lives at risk (at least not directly). That human remoteness alleviates some
concerns underlying arguments for congressional approval requirements, but it exacerbates
others because the relative invisibility of cyberattacks means that political checks function
weakly. As Jack Goldsmith and I have argued about “light-footprint” tools, including cyberoperations and drone attacks:
Light-footprint warfare is still lethal and very consequential warfare, and the lightness of
the tools make them relatively easy for a President to deploy extensively. Light-footprint
warfare thus has large foreign policy, strategic, and reputational consequences for the
United States, akin to much heavier deployments, yet much less public examination. The
President’s legal theories treat this as a feature of such warfare. But it is also a bug for U.S.
democracy, since the stealthy features mean that public debate and political checks—
which reduce error as well as excess, and promote legitimacy—function ineffectively.14

Another important reason why war powers may be special—and why many argue that
requirements of formal congressional approval are needed—is the risk of violent escalation.
A common argument is that congressional approval (following careful interbranch
deliberation) is especially important for measures that are likely to provoke armed
retaliation. In recent decades, executive-branch practice and legal justifications have
acknowledged this factor, too, in assessing whether a military intervention rises to the
level of “war” perhaps requiring congressional authorization. In its 2018 opinion justifying
President Trump’s air attacks against Syria, for example, the Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel considered this variable, noting that steps taken to reduce the probability of
military reprisals strengthened the argument that the strikes were within the president’s
authority.15 Inversely, if cyberattacks are likely to provoke violent responses, then arguably
they ought to require congressional sign-off.
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Real-world experience is still limited, and the escalation dynamics of cyberattacks are not
yet well understood. That said, some studies suggest that cyberattacks are on the whole
less likely than are kinetic attacks to provoke violent responses.16 Some experimental
data from crisis simulations indicates that even when they have destructive effects
similar to those of conventional attacks, cyberattacks might not have the same political
and emotional impacts that create pressures for violent retaliation (or even retaliation in
cyberspace).17 Other empirical and survey data show that, unlike conventional military
attacks, cyber operations are not so escalatory and that they also offer escalatory off-ramps
by providing response options other than conventional military conflict.18 At several
tense moments in 2019, for example, the United States reportedly chose to hit Iran with
cyberattacks on military systems and intelligence facilities, rather than with kinetic strikes,
in response to Iranian attacks on Saudi oil refineries and other provocations (including
downing an American drone). That reporting suggests that the United States chose
cyberattacks over kinetic ones in part because the former were viewed as less likely to drive
escalation.19
Of course there may be exceptions, especially for devastating cyberattacks. Moreover,
cyberattacks can have far-reaching unintended consequences that may magnify resultant
international friction or the risk of escalation. For example, as mentioned in the
introduction, malicious computer code (widely attributed to the United States) targeted
at Iranian nuclear plant control systems accidentally spread around the world.20 Russian
malware targeting Ukraine in 2017 quickly spread, too, and with far greater damage,
crippling computer systems across the globe.21 Furthermore, cyber operations, whether
intended to be offensive or defensive, will often be perceived as threatening by targeted
states, contributing to instability.22
However, evidence does not to date indicate that the risks are high that cyberattacks will
provoke conventional military responses. The risk is clearly not zero, and cyberattacks might
also result in escalation of other hostile measures, including economic ones or retaliation in
cyberspace. But the same is true of so many other instruments of state power—for example,
economic sanctions or diplomatic recognition decisions could cause a target state to lash
out—that we would never categorize as exercises of constitutional war powers.
Separate from the issues of direct costs and risks, another possible reason why it might make
sense to categorize at least some cyberattacks as exercises of war powers for constitutional
purposes is that states increasingly regard them as hostile military force as a matter of
international law. This point is probably applicable only to cyberattacks that directly cause
significant and direct physical destruction (say, causing a nuclear meltdown or plane crash)
or that produce widespread harm (say, temporarily disabling a major electrical grid). The
United States government has repeatedly asserted its right as a matter of international law
to respond to some cyberattacks with kinetic military force, on the theory that cyberattacks
could qualify as uses of “force” or “armed attacks” under the UN Charter.23 Many other
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powerful states agree with this view, and many academics—myself included—argue that
some cyberattacks are appropriately analogized as an international legal matter to kinetic
attacks.24 Defend Forward generally involves US cyber operations well below these levels.
Although treating some cyberattacks as uses of force or armed attacks for international law
purposes may not be determinative, it at least lends logical support to the idea that very
physically destructive cyberattacks (maybe a narrow category) should also qualify as uses of
force for constitutional purposes and thus trigger war powers analyses.
The international law and constitutional law analyses need not match up this way, though.
Formally, the relevant legal provisions differ: the Constitution obviously predates the UN
Charter, for example, and contains an intersecting set of relevant powers that have never
been interpreted to map one-for-one onto international law. Normatively, the UN Charter
and international self-defense law are almost entirely grounded in preserving international
peace and security, whereas constitutional war powers are grounded also in concerns
about both accountability and domestic control of military power. And, methodologically,
international law and constitutional law draw on different histories and argumentative
strategies for filling in legal gaps and ambiguities.
In sum, kinetic military attacks are rarely the correct constitutional analogy for
cyberattacks. Rather than a presumption that any cyberattack involves an exercise of war
powers, the presumption ought to be the opposite: that it does not. Although this paper is
concerned with constitutional issues, it is worth noting that according to this logic it is also
doubtful that most cyberattacks alone would or should be considered “hostilities” triggering
the statutory limitations of the War Powers Resolution.25 War powers were carved out as
a special constitutional category—one that originally required congressional approval for
particular actions and that some argue still ought to—and there should be a strong reason
to expand the category to cover new kinds of activities. It is not clear that most cyberattacks
make the cut.

Defend Forward and Constitutional Powers
If cyberattacks rarely (if ever) are exercises of war powers, then what constitutional powers
are cyberattacks exercises of? The short answer is: it depends.26 It is a mistake to try to fit
them all into any one constitutional category. Cyberattacks, as stated at the outset, make
up a broad category of activities. They could range from taking down or even destroying
critical infrastructure to spoofing internal communications, and many things in between,
like temporarily knocking offline air defense systems. Depending on the facts, cyberattacks
could be viewed as exercises of noncombat military powers, foreign affairs powers,
intelligence powers, and commerce powers—as well as combinations of these and still other
powers. This section uses the US Defend Forward concept to illustrate how those powers
can apply, and it also applies them to other hypothetical or past cyberattacks that may even
have significant and direct destructive effects.
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Defend Forward involves proactively countering malicious adversary cyber campaigns
through day-to-day competition. Defend Forward aims to disrupt adversary cyber
operations, deter future campaigns, and reinforce favorable international norms through
activity conducted beyond US networks—that is, activity inside adversary and third-party
networks.27 According to the 2018 Defense Department Cyber Strategy: “[The Department]
will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including
activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.”28
Most operations contemplated by the Defend Forward concept do not involve activities
that would count as “cyberattacks.” Such operations include establishing a presence in
foreign networks, mapping those networks, gathering information, and preparing for
future operations. Some Defend Forward activities are cyberattacks, though. These might
include interrupting communications from an adversary military facility used to infiltrate
US military command and control systems, inserting malware that deletes or encrypts
data on servers engaged in malign foreign influence campaigns online, or denying service
to networks used by adversary intelligence agencies to conduct industrial espionage. Such
operations involve combinations of several constitutional powers.

As Military Activity
Assuming the operation is conducted by the military (presumptively, Cyber Command),
one possibility is to treat it as an exercise of presidential power to engage in military
activities, but not, for constitutional purposes, the hostile application of armed force. The
president, as commander in chief of the armed forces, can take many steps using military
forces—forces provided by Congress—that impose costs on adversaries or involve risks of
retaliation or escalation, including moving combat forces into foreign theaters or engaging
in military exercises.29 US Attorney General Robert Jackson offered a classic formulation of
this view in a 1941 opinion concluding that the president had constitutional authority to
order the instruction of British pilots by American military service members at US training
facilities. As commander in chief of the armed forces, Jackson noted, the president “has
supreme command over the land and naval forces of the country and may order them to
perform such military duties as, in his opinion, are necessary or appropriate for the defense
of the United States. These powers exist in time of peace as well as in time of war.”30
Cyberattacks carried out by the US military inside foreign networks to, for example, prevent
or deter adversary efforts to infiltrate US information systems could be understood much
like the training of British pilots aimed at undermining German air superiority; without
physical destruction, they deny or degrade an adversary’s cyber capability. For that matter,
looking beyond Defend Forward, cyberattacks to degrade an adversary’s offensive or
defensive military capability might also be treated as analogous. Such cyberattacks include
the reported 2019 US cyber operation that wiped out information systems used by Iranian
forces to target ships.31 Yes, these examples may involve electronic transgression of territorial
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borders—and that may have international law implications—but any argument drawing
constitutional conclusions from this fact just begs the question whether and how digital
intrusion is constitutionally significant.
Importantly, although the president has wide latitude as commander in chief to engage
in military activities other than force absent statutory restrictions, Congress restricts such
types of military activities all the time. For example, Congress regulates the US military’s
training and equipping of foreign armed forces with substantive, procedural, and fiscal
restrictions,32 and Congress has historically imposed various types of restrictions on
peacetime deployments of troops abroad.33 Congress could likewise do more to limit
military cyber activities but has so far chosen not to.

As Foreign Relations
If a cyberattack is intended more for its communicative impact than its military impact, it
might better be thought of as modern-day “gunboat diplomacy.” This framing draws heavily
on both the president’s general powers as chief executive to conduct foreign relations,
including communicating threats, and his commander-in-chief powers to control military
forces.34 Temporarily taking offline an enemy’s digital infrastructure might be analogized
to overflying its territory, for example, as a show of capability that demonstrates adversary
vulnerability.
One might object that comparing cyberattacks that destroy or degrade adversary systems
to coercive diplomacy is inapt because the latter activities lack any direct contact with the
adversary and its assets. After all, most uses of military force that would unquestionably
implicate war powers—for example, punitive air strikes—are also intended more for their
communicative impact than their direct damage. But drawing constitutional conclusions
from this distinction again begs the question of what type of “contact” with the adversary
moves an action into the constitutional category of war powers.

As Intelligence Activities
Many cyberattacks of the sort envisioned by Defend Forward also involve exercises of
constitutional intelligence powers.35 This is a blurry area of constitutional law because
secrecy precludes the sort of public articulation of government legal analysis that often
accompanies military intervention. The executive branch has argued that the president
possesses broad authority, implicitly derived from the president’s power to conduct foreign
relations as well as his commander-in-chief powers, to engage in clandestine intelligence
activities to undermine enemy political, economic, and military systems. Another view is
that much of this power comes from statutory delegations from Congress, both express and
implied.36 Cyber operations designed only to collect information would clearly fit within
the category of intelligence powers, but this essay is concerned with those intended to have
disruptive or damaging effects.
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The executive branch has at times taken the view that the president’s power to engage in
intelligence activities includes directing some quasi-military activities, such as paramilitary
support to proxy groups or physical sabotage operations, as well as propaganda campaigns
and other political manipulation when conducted covertly (that is, so that the hidden hand
of the United States is plausibly deniable).37 Whether some of those intelligence activities,
particularly those involving physical violence, are really just a subset of war powers or
a different constitutional category altogether—and one that did not become important
until the Cold War—is unclear. Congress, for its part, has regulated covert intelligence
activities by enacting procedural and reporting requirements, such as the covert action
statute’s requirements of presidential sign-off and notification to congressional intelligence
committees.38 Oversight statutes of this nature can be understood either as recognizing
and limiting the president’s broad inherent intelligence powers or as implicitly authorizing
the president to engage in covert intelligence activities in the first place. Either way, the
resulting institutional model is one in which the president has not been required to
seek formal congressional approval for specific operations, but is required to meet other
congressionally imposed requirements.39
Cyberattacks conducted as part of Defend Forward will often involve the exercise of
intelligence powers, or perhaps can well be analogized to them. For starters, the means
of cyberattacks—surreptitiously entering and mapping foreign information networks for
vulnerabilities—is mostly an intelligence activity;40 the difference between “defensive”
intrusions and mapping of enemy networks and “offensive” disruptions of such networks
may be relatively small pieces of computer code. Furthermore, even some cyber operations
with damaging effects—such as altering data or implanting malware to disable or destroy
digital systems—are akin to black bag jobs, propaganda operations, or covert support for
proxy paramilitary forces, activities traditionally carried out by US intelligence agencies. A
cyber operation like Stuxnet, which targeted militarily significant and sensitive sites and
had significant, destructive physical effects, comes closer to an exercise of war powers but
bears an even stronger resemblance to past exercises of intelligence powers, such as physical
sabotage operations carried out by intelligence operatives or their proxies. Such operations
are usually treated as a different constitutional category.

As Foreign Commerce
Yet another possibility is that cyberattacks are a form of meddling with international
commerce, implicating the Constitution’s allocation of foreign commerce powers.
Domestically, telecommunications and other uses of the internet are uncontroversially
understood to fall under Congress’s Commerce Clause regulatory authority. Internationally,
too, operations to halt, redirect, or otherwise interfere in digital information flows could
be viewed as interventions into foreign commerce. I highlight this possibility because
unlike the categories above, intervention in the flow of commerce is expressly Congress’s
domain: Article I assigns to Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce. International
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commerce is also another arena in which the US government often wields tools—in
the form of economic and financial sanctions—that impose damage on foreign states,
organizations, and individuals in order to advance US foreign policy objectives. Indeed, it
is in part because foreign commerce is so connected with national defense that Congress
exercises much of its power in this area through broad delegations; it has granted the
president wide discretion to take economic measures to deal with foreign emergencies or
trade disputes, for example.41
For constitutional purposes it might seem like a stretch to analogize manipulating computer
code or digital information flows across borders to manipulating trade in goods or services.
So is analogizing such activities to dropping bombs or deploying troops, though. Moreover,
whereas kinetic military attacks may have incidental effects on private, commercial
property, some cyber operations use commercial infrastructure as an integral feature of
attack.
Of course, cyberattacks might involve several or even all of these constitutional powers
(noncombat military powers, foreign affairs powers, intelligence powers, commerce powers,
and perhaps others). Indeed, depending on the specific facts, cyberattacks should be
understood to involve various combinations of them. The main upshot is that while there
could perhaps be instances where cyberattacks are exercises of war powers, such instances
are exceedingly rare and limited to specific extreme cases. Most cyberattacks, especially
ones that do not rise to the level of uses of force or armed attacks under international law,
could fit in other categories. They could also form a new constitutional category altogether,
for which the respective roles of Congress and the president are not yet established.

Congress and Cyber Strategy
As stated at the outset, one reason to resist categorizing cyberattacks as exercises of war
powers is that the doctrinal fit is poor. That is not just rigid formalism; cyberattacks do not
implicate the main concerns underlying war powers law, at least not to the same degree
as does kinetic force. Another reason to resist that categorization is that it tends to limit
thinking about institutional arrangements. In particular, critics of presidential war powers
unilateralism tend to focus on specific congressional approval for actions, at least those
beyond a certain threshold. It may seem natural, under that view, to demand specific
congressional approval for cyberattacks or cyber campaigns beyond a certain threshold, too.
Proponents of presidential war powers unilateralism, meanwhile, tend to see congressional
regulation of such powers as dangerous, if not constitutionally suspect, meddling.
By contrast, the catalog of constitutional powers in the previous section, each of which
involves potent tools of international competition and conflict, brings along a wide array
of institutional arrangements. Moreover, to those who worry about executive unilateralism
with regard to cyber operations—and who therefore seek to bolster congressional

Hoover Institution • Stanford University

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3728829

12

checks and oversight—that catalog offers many more and stronger legal justifications for
congressional involvement than does a legal framework rooted primarily in war powers.
Congress shapes the use of noncombat military powers through, among other things,
legislating military force structures and organizational arrangements, annual appropriations
and authorization bills, and oversight processes. The president has a very free hand in
exercising some foreign affairs functions, but Congress can shape most of them using
powers of its own. Congress regulates intelligence largely through special oversight and
statutory procedural requirements, and, especially when national security is involved,
it often regulates international commerce through broad delegations of authority to the
executive branch.
As Robert Chesney has shown, Congress is already quite engaged in shaping US cyber
strategy, including pushing and facilitating more assertive uses of military cyber operations
against particular adversaries.42 That congressional involvement includes a wide range of
institutional arrangements typical of coercive tools besides military force.
Congress has pressed the Defense Department to build up its offensive cyber capacity
through annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs),43 for example. It has
clarified the Defense Department’s authority to conduct offensive cyber operations,44
thereby strengthening its position within the executive branch. Congress has also tried to
streamline the internal executive-branch approval of cyber operations while setting outer
boundaries on how those operations should be conducted. For example, it has provided
clearer statutory authority for the Defense Department to conduct wide-ranging clandestine
cyber operations considered short of hostilities, including in areas where hostilities are
not occurring, thereby enabling quicker and more flexible Defense Department action in
countering cyber adversaries outside US computer networks.45
Congress has acted to enhance oversight of cyberattacks, mandating special reporting
requirements to the armed services committees for offensive and “sensitive” military
cyber operations.46 Cyberattacks conducted as covert action by the CIA are reported
separately to the intelligence committees under long-standing arrangements, as are other
intelligence activities that might fit within this essay’s definition of cyberattacks. Such
reporting is foundational to other congressional roles, because it keeps Congress—or at
least certain committees—informed of executive-branch actions that would otherwise
be largely invisible. As discussed above, cyberattacks are especially invisible compared to
other methods of international conflict, so robust congressional oversight is arguably extraimportant as a stand-in for public scrutiny. One continuing challenge for Congress, then,
is to design more meaningful reporting requirements, especially ones that get at results of
cyber operations—that is, that emphasize the outputs (which are difficult to assess) rather
than just the inputs of US cyber activities themselves. Congress might partly address this
issue by requiring notification of committees not only of operations and targets but also of
certain types of collateral damage or effects.
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In short, concern that cyber is an area of executive unilateralism is misplaced, especially
when it comes to cyber operations conducted by the US military. Congress and the
executive are already collaborating on a system built through interbranch deliberation,
and invoking war powers—either along with a belief in broad inherent executive-branch
authority or along with insistence on case-by-case congressional approval—is neither
appropriate nor useful. As Chesney writes: “With little fanfare and less public notice,
Congress and the executive branch have cooperated effectively over the past decade to build
a legal architecture for military cyber operations.”47
It is true that this legal architecture leaves the president with a lot of discretion to engage
in cyber operations or cyberattacks, at least those that fall below a very high threshold
constituting war (if one takes the view that cyberattacks alone could ever meet that bar),
without getting additional congressional approval. That discretion is a product of both
inherent constitutional power and delegated power from Congress.
At least with regard to Defend Forward, there is a powerful strategic logic to that vast zone
of discretion. When it comes to using hostile kinetic military force, strategy usually involves
specific breakpoints in time and conflict intensity: as tensions with a specific adversary rise,
the United States sustains a military attack, or as a threat grows, the United States moves
from not using force to using it. It is often an on/off switch. Normally, the military force
switch is off, and at a particular moment the government turns it on. At that moment,
constitutional war powers are activated.
In contrast to the on/off nature of most kinetic military intervention, Defend Forward involves
a constant level of cyber conflict; the United States must be continually prosecuting it.48
Cyber Command’s chief and a top adviser recently described its implementation this way:
Cyber Command implements this defend forward strategy through the doctrine of
persistent engagement. The idea behind persistent engagement is that so much of the
corrosive effects of cyber attacks against the United States occur below the threshold of
traditional armed conflict. . . . This doctrine of persistent engagement reflects the fact
that one-off cyber operations are unlikely to defeat adversaries. Instead, U.S. forces must
compete with adversaries on a recurring basis, making it far more difficult for them to
advance their goals over time.49

“There is also consensus across the U.S. government that great-power competitors are
making strategic gains in and through cyberspace with persistent, targeted campaigns that
never rise to the level of a catastrophic cyber attack,” writes Emily Goldman, a policy official
at Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. Therefore, “Competing below the
level of armed conflict and contesting malicious cyber activity in day-to-day competition
are consistent themes across the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and
the 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy.”50
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The type of continuous agility called for in such situations matches especially poorly with
the sort of rigid requirements for case-by-case congressional approval critics of unilateral
presidential war powers often call for. The case-by-case model is workable when there is a
clear and visible initiation point, or a break from baseline dormancy. The vast majority of
US cyberattacks, however, will be part of constant and largely invisible campaigns against
multiple adversaries simultaneously. Indeed, in recent years the executive branch has
also instituted reforms to delegate decision making on cyber operations to lower levels of
command, too, in order to better achieve that continuous agility.51
It may well be that Congress and future presidential administrations will move toward
a different strategy. There may also be rare US offensive cyberattacks that look more like
discrete applications of military force. For now, though, a war powers framing matches
poorly the way the United States actually conducts cyberattacks.

Conclusion
Cyberattacks are a national capability the exercise of which usually involves no direct
risk to American lives, is largely invisible to the public eye, could possibly but is relatively
unlikely to escalate to conventional military conflict, and for which international law
and norms are uncertain and evolving. At the most general level, this essay is about
constitutional analogies: What exercises of power are cyberattacks most like? Constitutional
categorization by analogy is important in this case not just for doctrinal reasons but because
how one categorizes cyberattacks triggers certain conventions, practices, and political
arguments regarding how overlapping executive and legislative power is shared.
Cyberattacks-as-war-powers is one possible answer, but it is rarely—and maybe never—a
good fit. There are many other categories that, in combination, better fit most cyberattacks,
including operations conducted as part of Defend Forward. Those categories provide
better doctrinal justifications for executive action, as well as for congressional regulation.
Viewing cyberattacks through those alternative lenses also helps to open up a wider array of
institutional arrangements that more appropriately match emerging cyber strategy.
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